



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


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The German Tribune

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...ty-second year - No. 1089 - By air

Stuttgart summit a sort of success



...C leaders staked a great deal on the outcome of the Stuttgart sum-... They may, possibly, have made a ...gains.

...terms of original expectations ...gart was a disappointment. In ...s of fears of failure it was a plea-... surprise.

...l or nothing was the motto of Bonn ...ncellor Helmut Kohl, the host. He ...eded in getting everyone to agree ...e need for success.

... several points during the three ... the summit was only a hair's ...dth from breakdown.

...e task was virtually impossible: to ...e on new targets for the European ...munity, to impose genuine spend-...cuts and to solve the problem of ...in's contribution to the EEC kitty.

...t each of the Ten has a different ...ept of the Common Market (al-... assuming they all have clear ideas ...he subject).

...rs Thatcher made life difficult for ...opposite numbers again. Fresh from ...ry at the polls she talked in terms ...ard cash and not of future concepts ...he European Community.

...e first insisted on Britain being ...bursed DM3bn. The Ten eventually ...ed, relatively fast by EEC stan-...s, on roughly half: DM1.7bn.

...hat contradicted German ideas ...ed at economies not expenditure, ...it paved the way to understanding ...ong-term issues.

...t was by no means a glorious victory ...Mrs Thatcher, who is to get back ... than she did last year. The swift ...eement was a definite improvement ...last spring's protracted negotiations.

It is still annoying that countless summit sessions and meetings of the EEC Council of Ministers are confronted time and again with demands made by Britain's Iron Lady.

But much of the blame lies with Britain's partners, not with Mrs Thatcher. The EEC, originally designed to meet the requirements of the Six, has been due to undergo changes ever since Britain joined 10 years ago.

For the past 10 years the Common Market countries have promised to rejig the European Community in such a way that Britain derives adequate benefit from membership.

Yet the Common Agricultural Policy still accounts for two thirds of the European Community's DM52bn budget, and Britain derives very little benefit from CAP.

The promised rejig has failed to materialise because the Ten no longer have common objectives, but now the EEC is on the brink of insolvency they will have to reach a decision.

Bonn would soonest economise, and that was the declared policy line to be followed at the Stuttgart summit. But everyone knows that savings, even on CAP, are not enough.

The European Community can only make genuine headway by reaching agreement on its objectives, not just by paring percentages here and there.

This is a point Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher readily appreciate, but their tactical concept could only work if they insisted on economies as a precondition.

This they succeeded in doing at Stuttgart. All 10 heads of government undertook to cut Community expenditure, especially in the agricultural sector.

That alone was new in the history of the Common Market. It was combined with a bid — to which equal importance was attached — to consider fresh targets in the energy and research sectors.

On the face of it this second point means more expenditure by Brussels, but the EEC is merely to do what the Community can set about more effectively than an individual country, which is a sensible idea.

The most striking outcome of the Stuttgart summit was that a concentrated debate by the 10 heads of state and government, in whom great expectations were placed, can indeed accomplish results.

Previous EEC summits had given rise to doubts whether this was in fact the case.

The dual-track Stuttgart resolution was both to economise and to press ahead with further development of the European Community.

It remains to be seen whether this compromise will hold. Whether it does or not will certainly show whether the solemn declaration on European Union was worth the paper it was printed on.

Mrs Thatcher is to get her money. In return she had to give the go-ahead, as Bonn had already done, to an increase in the EEC budget.

It is now up to the Council of Ministers to put into effect the summit's decisions on economies that in many cases are extremely vaguely worded.

Maybe the intensive debate in Stuttgart will prompt heads of government to pay closer attention to what their Ministers get up to in the months ahead.

If Herr Kohl and his counterparts were to release their Ministers from this commitment to succeed in the months to come the Stuttgart summit would not have amounted to much.

All that would be left would be more money for the EEC but no rethink on EEC policy. Stuttgart started the ball rolling. The outcome is still uncertain.


Ulrich Lüke
(Die Welt, 20 June 1983)

IN THIS ISSUE



All smiles at Stuttgart. In front from left, Irish Prime Minister Garret Fitzgerald, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand. Behind, Foreign Ministers Claude Cheysson (France), Sir Geoffrey Howe (Britain) and Colette Flesch (Luxembourg); Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers and Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. (Photo: dpa)

EEC leaders beat a laborious path to a compromise



Common Market leaders put in more work at Stuttgart than at any previous EEC summit. They succeeded in arriving at a major compromise.

Whether it works will not be clear until the year's end, by when a number of reform proposals are to have been drafted in detail.

The partial progress so laboriously made in Stuttgart shows at least that the Ten feel the Common Market is important enough to be maintained.

They feel its breakdown is worth preventing even though national financial difficulties leave them with little or no leeway.

One reform envisaged is for industrial renewal to be promoted from Brussels. There are plans for EEC companies to cooperate in the new technologies to ensure that Europe does not lag even further behind America and Japan.

More is also to be done on environmental protection. But time will tell, just as we must wait and see what becomes of the fight against unemployment and the promotion of economic recovery.

The leaders of the Ten made noble-sounding declarations on these issues. It will be up to the Council of Ministers to flesh them out.

The summit made little headway on reinforcing the European Community politically. The solemn declaration on European Union the EEC leaders signed was much less than the 1981 Genscher-Colombo Plan envisaged.

It did not eliminate the unwritten rights of veto Common Market countries have on the Council of Ministers, while even the minor addition to the rights enjoyed by the European Parliament are hamstrung by Danish reservations.

That Chancellor Kohl can lay claim to success is due mainly to the experience of his Foreign Minister.


At times the package he aimed to get passed seemed doomed to failure because British and French interests clashed head-on.

But in the end, as chairman of the European Council, he made it and could fairly claim to have made the Stuttgart summit a success.

Erich Hauser
(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 20 June 1983)

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Poland lands the Pope with a challenge



Four years ago, after the exhilaration of a 10-day Papal visit, sceptical Poles noted bitterly that John Paul II had gone and left them with Edward Gierek.

Who would then have imagined that the logic of faint-heartedness was so soon to be bowled over by reality?

Yet it was those 10 days in which Poland was virtually under Papal rule that paved the way for the changes that swept the country in summer 1980.

In June 1979 the 36 million Poles who flocked round John Paul II in fraternal jubilation were overwhelmed by a sudden realisation that their regular rulers in reality represented no-one but themselves.

The regime likewise began to realise that it was totally isolated and didn't even have a Party behind it.

That was the starting point for political acitivity by the people, for 16 months of Solidarity and freedom that were ended by General Jaruzelski's martial law.

The war, as the current state of affairs is referred to by nearly all Poles, has been going on for 18 months.

The waiving of the strictest security measures and a gradual improvement in supplies have not for a moment persuaded the people to come to terms with the regime.

General Jaruzelski knows this only too well. Compared with him even Mr Gierek (who at least invested billions of dollars in Poland, rebuilt the Royal Palace in Warsaw and let people muddle on) was far from unpopular.

So what prompted the martial law general to invite the Pope to visit Poland and return to the historic point that proved his predecessors' undoing?

The Russians are known to take a dim view of the idea, and understandably so. The Kremlin thoroughly disliked *the prospect of the Pope spending a further week in Poland and making live appearances with media coverage without the regime knowing beforehand what he was going to say.*

General Jaruzelski felt he was running a calculated risk. For him the Pope was first and foremost the long-awaited blockade-runner, the first visitor from the West since martial law was imposed in December 1981.

He was sure to be followed by others, and once the ice was broken, the regime not unrealistically reasoned, the tough economic sanctions on Poland would be relaxed and Western loans might even be available again.

The general's second reason for inviting the Pope to visit Poland was outlined in leading articles in the official Press.

While the Opposition is steadily losing public support, leader-writers argued, the Church advocates law and order and is collaborating with the authorities in preparing for the Papal visit.

General Jaruzelski is unlikely to harbour *any illusions that the Pope and the* clergy propose to lend a hand in reconciling the people with a regime they both utterly reject.

But he is aware of the opportunity his regime stands to gain from the fact that Poland's ecclesiastical hierarchy is reluctant to let the country go to the dogs.

Martial law was still in force in full and Lech Walesa and many others were still in custody when Cardinal Glemp and General Jaruzelski jointly opposed industrial action and advocated social peace on 8 November 1982.

It was no coincidence that the first official mention was made on the same day of plans to invite the Pope to revisit Poland.

Many Poles, including members of the clergy, have to this day felt unable to forgive Cardinal Glemp this move.

His patriotic pragmatism is naturally to the dictatorship's advantage. Yet it cannot be denied that the Polish people would be unable to daily voice resistance to the regime were it not for the protection afforded by the Church.

It was a tough assignment for the Pope. He was invited to visit the country to calm down majority of his fellow-countrymen were expecting him to voice his opposition to an contempt for the regime.

Yet if he were to go too far the Poles might be prompted to embark on forms of resistance that would be bound to have tragic consequences.

And if he were to go too far in the other direction, advocating compromise too eagerly, or even resignation, the Church in Poland would run the risk of alienating itself from the people.

Poles implicitly trusted in the Pope's ability to get the message right and say exactly what people were thinking. They felt he was a genius of spontaneity who would hit the right note with the uncanny accuracy of a sleepwalker.

Many will be unaware that the Pope has changed since the attempt on his life. Can he tell his fellow-countrymen to fear not, as he did four years ago?

He is going to have to find a different formula.

Carlos Widmann
(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15 June 1983)

An unpromis[ing] curtain-rais[er] for Stuttga[rt]

The Luxembourg confe[rence of] Common Market Foreign [Ministers] held in preparation for the [...] summit ended on a sad note.

A report drawn up with Ger[man tho]roughness and pinpointing cu[rrent pro]blems from the EEC's financi[ng ...] to the Common Agricultural Po[licy ...] ed to meet with the Ten's appro[val].

The product of so much hard [work in] Bonn was dismissed by other [members] of the European Community [as the] handiwork of accounts clerks.

Foreign Minister Genscher [...] ly succeeded in persuading his [...] numbers to regard as confiden[tial the] deliberations and clashes in spe[cial ses]sion.

Even so, France's tempe[...] Claude Cheysson had no illusi[ons ...] let the cat out of the bag[:] "Nothing will be decided in Stu[ttgart ...] will all be shelved."

After this meagre outcome in [Luxem]bourg it does indeed look a[s if] Stuttgart may be a fiasco, with [the Ger]mans continuing to hold the ba[by].

Bonn can only absolve itse[lf of re]sponsibility, it would seem, b[y ...] the go-ahead without binding [...] tions for a financial shot in the [arm to] balance the EEC budget.

It is a tall order to expect F[i]nance Minister Gerhard Stolte[nberg to] bail the Common Market ou[t with a] further DM4bn, but the others [are ada]mant.

While appreciating the sacrifi[ces Ger]many is expected to make for[...] sake they claim that both politi[cally and] economically Bonn comes out [...] the Ten.

Germany undeniably does h[alf its fo]reign trade with other Commo[n Market] countries, thereby bolstering [...] four million jobs.

For each of these jobs Herr S[tolten]berg is now expected to contri[bute an] extra DM1,000 to the Europea[n Com]munity kitty in Brussels.

Bonn would be less reluctan[t to pay] out the cash if it felt the extr[a ...] were not bound to underwrite th[e Com]mon Agricultural Policy and its [...]

Failing restrictions of one kin[d or an]other the extra cash is sure to be [...] ed by the eight million EEC [...] who can be expected to produ[ce] higher surpluses.

Bonn would dearly like to end [this vi]cious circle, but as host to the S[tuttgart] summit faces energetic oppositi[on from at] least eight agricultural countries.

Helmut J. Wi[...]
(Rheinische Post, 15 [...])

The German Tribun[e]

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It will be several months before we can be sure whether the conferences of Nato Defence and Foreign Ministers have made peace in and around Europe safer or not.

The first but by no means only pointer will be the progress and outcome of the Geneva talks on medium-range missiles in Europe.

Nato made it clear in Paris that the stationing of Pershing 2s in Germany and Cruise missiles in Britain and Italy would go ahead at the end of the year unless results were achieved in Geneva.

No further decisions need taking on this point, and the governments concerned, including Bonn, are committed to this schedule.

Reconsideration, consultations and possibly fresh decisions, both at Nato and national level, will only be needed if a compromise is reached in Geneva.

No-one in Paris was optimistic; quite the reverse. This is partly negotiating tactics, diplomatic poker, as it were. But the other side has yet to show any sign that might warrant hopes of agreement.

Top-level Soviet rejections of President Reagan's latest proposals at the other Geneva talks, the Start talks on intercontinental missiles, shows yet again how inflexible Moscow is.

If it remains inflexible there will be even less hope of the Geneva "walk in the woods" agreement, the package drawn up last summer by the US and Soviet chief delegates, being reactivated.

Now the wait to see what Geneva brings

Nato officials in Paris categorically denied that any mention of this medium-range missiles package had been made at the conferences.

The question mainly arose because President Mitterrand twice referred positively to the "walk in the woods" proposals as a compromise that had been a missed opportunity.

He did so on two successive days during the Nato conference, first on TV, then at an evening reception.

It was a striking remark to make because M. Mitterrand otherwise taken an extremely pessimistic view of the prospects at Geneva.

A French initiative in this connection would be in keeping with his evident efforts to mediate between the Americans and the Europeans on security and economic policies.

If he were to succeed M. Mitterrand would be taking wind out of the sails of both domestic critics and his Communist coalition partners.

So maybe the last word has yet to be spoken about the walk-in-the-woods proposals, although no-one can say what line Moscow may take.

Prior to the Nato communiqué, or the Paris signal, as Herr Genscher was pleased to call it, the Soviet Union might have been able to use the walk-in-the-woods proposals to drive a wedge between America and Europe.

But in the wake of the Nato summit any such fears seem far less justified.

Regard for a possible compromise at the medium-range missile talks did not assume crucial importance in Paris. There can be no mistaking a rapprochement between the two sides in other respects.

Paris, the venue, doubtless played a part, with France stressing its solidarity with Nato more clearly than ever after a steady improvement in ties with the North Atlantic pact in recent years.

France was also able to make greater play than ever with its independence and sovereignty, but very much along the lines of Nato as a whole.

President Reagan's America is prepared to stomach from France home truths it might not otherwise be prepared to take from anyone except perhaps Britain.

But M. Mitterrand is more critical of Washington than Mrs Thatcher, for which he deserves the other Europeans' gratitude.

The outcome, the Paris signal, is certainly impressive.

Hans Gerlach
(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 13 June 1983)

HOME AFFAIRS

CDU brings its sights to bear on CSU's Bavaria

[Th]e Christian Democrats have alter[ed] their regulations so that they will [be a]ble to campaign in Bavaria for the [Euro]pean Parliament next year.

[So] the party has given itself the capa[city] to break the Christian Social [Unio]n monopoly in Bavaria.

[Th]ere are two possible reason for the [move], which was approved at the CDU [nati]onal congress in Cologne.

[Th]e party is firing a warning shot [aime]d at keeping the CSU under con[trol b]y maintaining a permanent threat [of mo]ving in politically; or

[it] really does intend setting up a list [of n]ational candidates and its own Ba[vari]an branch.

[M]any regard a possible march by the [CD]U into the Free State of Bavaria as a [serio]us mistake.

[F]ranz Josef Strauss and his team in [Mun]ich, for their part, seek to appease [by] pointing out that all the CDU is [no]w is thinking about what the CSU [wan]ted thinking about in 1976 in [Kre]uth.

[I]f Kohl really wants such a move, the [CS]U will "bow to the decision from [abo]ve" and bid it a "hearty welcome".

However, the whole problem is by no means as minor as some would have us believe.

If nothing else, it has caused considerable confusion within the CSU and sections of the CDU, an assertion which is confirmed by the constant riding-around on the issue by CSU politicians.

The CSU's general secretary, Wiesheu, for example, urgently demands an "interpretation" of the "mysterious" decisions taken in Cologne.

Many top CSU politicians reproach their colleagues in the CDU for not abiding by the agreement reached following the decision taken in Kreuth in 1976 to opt out of the joint CDU-CSU parliamentary group. This agreement obliges both parties to consult one another if steps are planned to change the existing political landscape.

The Cologne coup was not coordinated with the Bavarian sister-party. It even surprised many CDU delegates. Indeed, no-one is quite sure what its real intention is.

The explanation by the head of the CDU that the alterations only means that the CDU now has an instrument which other parties have had for a long time, does seem rather naive.

If the CDU were to take decisions which have no real meaning and no real intention this really would be a sign of the shortcomings of the most important party in government.

This therefore leaves us with two feasible explanations for the Cologne decision. Either Kohl's party wishes to fire a warning shot across the CSU's bow, or it really does intend setting up a national list of candidates and even its own Bavarian section.

In both cases the amendment to the statutes would only then serve its purpose if the CDU makes its presence felt.

It is a well-known fact that keeping the big stick in the cupboard is not the best disciplinary means.

However, attempts to set up the CDU on a nationwide basis would have to be discussed in detail with the party office in Munich to avoid the risk of open battle with the CSU.

Up to now, the party strategists from Cologne have remained silent. Perhaps the initiators of the amendment are frightened of their own courage.

The CSU at any rate has publicly demonstrated that it regards the decision taken in Cologne as a suggestion for discussion.

Many CDU politicians will realise that a separate CDU in Bavaria is likely to cause more damage to the conservative alliance than anything else. In the medium-term, in fact, it may even endanger the ability to govern in Bonn.

Talk by Strauss of setting up a "fourth party", which would now be the "fifth party" following the election successes by the Greens, was meaningful as long as the conservative parties were in the Opposition. At the time, Strauss believed that as long as the FDP remained in coalition with the SPD, the only way to shift governing majorities would be to create a new and separate party-political force in Germany.

Two conservative parties, catering for the right-wing and left-wing conservative voters, and then bringing in the electoral harvest together on a national basis, this seemed at the time an interesting proposition.

But what have the CDU and CSU to gain by changing the party landscape now that they are in power in Bonn?

The CSU would, of course, like to see the FDP made superfluous, and gain an absolute majority with the CDU on its own. Yet the price to be paid for upsetting the cart is too high, namely unity, an essential factor in maintaining power in Bonn.

In the end, the emergence of the CDU and CSU as two separate "national" parties would lead to greater competition in general and would have an adverse effect on the day-to-day activities in Bonn.

It has already become difficult enough to accommodate the differing positions adopted by both groups.

If the CDU and CSU were to compete against one another as rivals, it would be even more difficult to reach a compromise.

When in Opposition, many demands can be made, but the Opposition parties are not called upon to push these through. When in government, however, the governing coalition partners must assume greater responsibility and show greater effectiveness.

As soon as one conservative partner begins to try and create its own image at the expense of the other partner, this means a final farewell to any hopes of lasting harmony.

The voter would find himself confronted by a pugnacious coalition, with Conservatives and Liberals alike competing for the limelight of controversy.

Germans were repelled by this only recently and this contributed towards toppling a government.

Joachim Hauck
(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 8 June 1983)

Greens seek a poll on the missiles issue

[Th]e Greens in Bonn have introduced a draft bill in the Bundestag with [the] aim of enabling a public opinion [poll] to be conducted on the question of [stati]oning new medium-range missiles [on] German soil.

[T]his is not to be confused with a refe[ren]dum, which is not recognised by [Ger]man Basic Law.

[T]here are good reasons for not allow[ing] referendums. Historical experiences [hav]e not been the best.

[H]owever, a consultative public opi[nion] poll would also involve elements [of a] plebiscite. This always results in [con]flict in a representative democracy.

[T]he Greens state that such an opi[nion] poll can only serve as a "reference [gui]deline" for Parliament.

[H]owever, the "normal" opinion [poll]s, which indicate that the majority [of t]he German population are against [stati]oning new missiles, already serve [this] purpose.

[I]f Parliament were to disregard the [ma]jority result of a public opinion poll [of t]he kind planned by the Greens, the [lat]ter may begin to treat the opinion [pol]l as if it were in reality a referendum.

[A]nd what about possible opinion [poll]s on introducing the death penalty, [bri]ng back welfare benefits or expell[ing] foreigners from Germany?

[W]ho is to decide which problems are [esse]ntial for a nation and which are [...]

[W]ho can prevent the crafty wording [of q]uestions in such opinion polls from [ma]nipulating the will of the electorate?

[N]ot only are there a great number of [ris]ks involved in such a move but cons[tit]utional law experts would have to de[cid]e whether such a public opinion poll [co]mplies with the Basic Law.

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 9 June 1983)

Coalition still needs to do a bit of smoothing out

There are a increasing reports of friction and even open conflict in the Bonn coalition.

An uninvolved observer might think that the coalition between the CDU-CSU and the FDP is gradually disintegrating after eight months.

On vital economic, financial and security questions, the coalition appear to be basically intact.

The stumbling blocks in a smaller number of policy fields, which are not unimportant: demonstration law, *Deutschlandpolitik*, and policies towards the Middle East and Africa.

The fact that the CDU/CSU and the FDP are not exactly the best of friends after 13 years of rivalry is hardly surprising.

However, the price is now being paid for the rather hasty coalition agreement between Kohl and Genscher. A more detailed step-by-step arrangement would have been better.

For during this agreement the head of the CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, did not get a personal look-in when it came to forming the cabinet.

He has been throwing a spanner in the works in Bonn ever since, or at least getting his henchmen to do so.

Too many Liberals think there is more to be gained from boosting their own image by dissociating themselves from Strauss than by committing themselves wholeheartedly to the coalition with Kohl.

But the coalition problems still only represent a scratch on the general appearance of all three government partners.

However, if Strauss keeps on giving vent to his personal and political feelings of resentment, if the Free Democrats continue to react in such an undisciplined way, and if Kohl and Genscher fail to get all this under control, the strength of the government alliance between Conservatives and Liberals will be sapped. This would cripple their ability to act.

Jürgen Lorenz
(Kieler Nachrichten, 9 June 1983)

The debate on deployment gets new angle

All parties in the Bundestag agreed during a special security debate that do not want to see more missiles stationed in Germany.

But there are deep differences of opinion on which are the best means of reducing the threat posed to Europe by the missiles.

The Bonn coalition parties believe that the USA will do its utmost to negotiate in Geneva on the basis of the NATO double-decision and will only then deploy if negotiations break down completely.

The SPD on the other hand has its doubts as to whether the USA is not already undermining this double-decision by encouraging the stationing of new missiles while negotiations are still taking place.

SPD defence expert Egon Bahr gathered a great deal of evidence for this in the form of statements by military officials and politicians at various levels.

In his opinion, these statements go to show that at least in US military circles no-one believes that the talks in Geneva will lead to success.

He did admittedly concede that Soviet armament must be countered in some way.

The further course of the Bundestag debate drowned the agreement on this vital point.

The possibility of success in Geneva remains open right up until the final round of talks in September. All hopes now centre on some kind of agreement by then.

Despite the considerable differences of opinion in the Bundestag, there is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union could draw the conclusion from the security debate that the West is not able or determined to take the appropriate steps if and when the time comes.

The decision to rearm if talks in Geneva fail has long since been taken.


No one can be surprised by the fact that the German government is strictly sticking to the schedule, although this should not be misinterpreted.

On the contrary, it should help ease the political situation at home.

Ralf Lehmann
(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 16 June 1983)

■ FINANCE

Economic summit meetings reveal gulf between aims and reality



International economic summit meetings do not trigger off the kind of jubilant public response they once did.

The regular international get-togethers of the heads of government are more often than not accompanied by disillusionment and limited expectations. The staggering heights of summit success have given way to the doldrums of international economic crisis.

As shown by the summit in Williamsburg, it is becoming more and more difficult to obtain generally acceptable solutions to solving the economic growth and labour market problems facing the world economy.

The inability to reach agreement on interest rates all too clearly reveals the discrepancy between high-flying summit goals and international economic realities.

The international trade conference of Gatt in Belgrade may suffer the same fate. Up until the end of June, over 150 countries will be doing their best to defuse the North-South conflict.

It is hoped to turn the conference into the "summit of compromise". A praiseworthy intention.

However, this may once again be a case of the power of the real world triumphing over goodwill.

At least the meeting's motto of implementing "parallel processes" on an international basis seems to be a more encouraging remedy to the world's current problems.

The economic upswing in industrialised countries, therefore, is to be accompanied by increased support for countries of the Third World.

In the face of 32 million unemployed in industrialised countries and depleted government coffers, this is easier said than done. After all, everybody's still waiting for the upswing.

The longer the world has to wait for the improvement of the economic situation, the more grounds there are for fearing that a cardinal error of economic policy will re-emerge: passing one's own economic problems onto other countries.

This is one of the central problems in the European Community.

For some time now, the uniting of Europe has been making no progress, or at best moving along at a snail's pace. The many top-level meetings can do nothing to alter this fact.

If the various communiqués are compared with reality, it will soon be discovered that despite the proclamations of harmony the rift between economic realities and economic policies is widening.

As the President of the EEC Commission, Gaston Thorn, put it recently, the governments of the 10 member states are doggedly fighting against the crisis. Up to now, however, it's a case of one for one rather than one for all and the success of such individual efforts leaves a great deal to be desired.

Most of the problems facing the European Community are indeed marked by an international dimension.

Interdependencies and the mutual embedment in the international economic system almost challenge countries to change their solitary ways and take advantage of the benefits solidarity can offer.

The fact is, economic nationalism is the wrong recipe. This applies to the Atlantic Alliance as well as the North-South relationship.

It is particularly distressing that such a strong alliance as the EEC is not able to overcome national egoisms.

This is underlined most clearly by the permanent conflict over contributions to the Community budget.

Once again Thorn hits the nail on the head: "The real costs of a European Community which remains bogged down in the quagmire of national interests are the following: ... mic and technological ... vast unemployment, increa... sation and the gradual des... the Community's order".

Not only are the necess... and their proper use missing ... larly in agricultural — but ... common crisis strategy.

The French, for example, ... growth policy differently ... and there is a general pani... ways when it comes to ho... unemployment.

The internationalisation of ... policy-making needs a solid ... substructure, this is true (and ... accepted). However, the harm... of economic policies is just ... tant.

Resorting to nationalist ... policies in splendid isolation ... leads up a blind alley.

The EEC summit in Stuttg... pave the way for a really fr... where there is no more room ... subsidies and protectionist te...

(Der Tagesspiegel, ...)

Church cong...

Continued from page ...

the world, he underlined "the ... of an oversimplified, superf... over-technicised sense of ... sense of reason which is no ... as it lack humanity."

Many young people are ... bridge this gap via their belief...

This is why, in their eyes, the ... dividing lines between religio... faith and commitment.

Hein...

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, ...)

Locomotive theory revived from an unexpected quarter

The Bank for International Settlements usually makes extremely cautious diagnoses of the economic situation. It rarely makes concrete proposals for recovery.

It is all the more surprising, therefore, that it has revived a modified version of the locomotive theory many had long since forgotten.

However, instead of deman... a single country trigger off the ... detonation with heavy credit ... and thus in the end drag the ... ternational economy out of its ... it hopes that economic momen... enable the most healthy wester... mies to re-establish economi... and do the job together.

The bank hopes that bringing ... locomotive theory again will ... the vital spark needed to stim... world economy.

It realises at the same time tha... sins of the past cannot be men... in credit financing in general, b... choice of investments to be fina...

The problems both home and ... were mainly caused by the fact ... governments gave little thought ... ther the objects were productive ... ficial or whether they would bu... ture budgets with resultant costs.

Although this analysis may be ... there are doubts as to its effe... in day-to-day policies.

Politicians often only refer ... nable criteria when the money ... tap is turned off.

And as soon as the money sta... ing again, the good intention... pear. The voters sometimes ... non-productive more highly.

(Stuttgarter Zeitung, ...)

Balance of payments figures show an ominous trend

The short-term and hectic swings of the balance-of-payments needle should not be overrated, particularly if the figures have been greatly distorted by spectacular monetary movements in the wake of currency revaluations.

Nevertheless, even if the immense gap of DM11bn in April must be viewed as the exception rather than the rule, the Federal Republic's most important economic data do reflect an ominous deterioration.

Although the export surplus is still commendable, the impressive heights reached just before the end of 1982 really are a thing of the past.

The continuing decline in export orders also suggest that the trade surplus will drop.

The weak state of the long-term balance on capital account also gives cause for concern. This balance above all covers investments, transactions in securities and bank lendings which, as opposed to the monetary transactions dealt with by the short-term balance on capital account, do not have a markedly speculative character.

And all this despite the fact that many experts expected foreign capital to pour into Germany after the "change" of government and government policy in Bonn.


This has not happened up to now. Even the massive purchase of shares by foreign investors, which are regarded as motivating forces for the new German stock-exchange *Wunder*, appear not to have been so massive after all. At any rate, they have been balanced by the simultaneous selling of bonds.

If this negative trend for the trade and capital balances continue, this would lead to a dwindling of the *Bundesbank's* currency reserves, particularly pronounced in April.

Germany's top monetary "officials" would then increasingly come under pressure to increase the prime interest rate, despite all recent statements to the contrary. This would be the only way to bridge the interest-rate gap to the dollar area, which is soaking up the mass of capital at present.

Such a move would help prevent a weakening of the D-mark. If this move is made, however, hopes of an economic upswing can be buried once and for all.

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 11 June 1983)



■ BUSINESS

Monopolies: never-ending fight of the cartel office

...man anti-cartel legislation is re... garded as among the toughest in ...

...Act has been amended four times ... it 25 years in an effort to come ... with the varied attempts to un... the principles of fair competi...

...hough there have been plenty of ... ations upholding these principles ... recent years, the real world ... bit different.

...-fixing, co-operation between ... nies in all possible fields and ... are just some of the efforts to ... restrict fairness in competi...

...pite the amendments, it is doubt... the legislation is yet efficient ...

...concentration of power has taken ... a section of the economy where ... would have expected it a few ... ago: the distribution sector.

...reas the search for the enemies ... competition often focussed on ... supply side, that is the producers, a ... ntration of power has been set up ... demand side.

...unless the authorities clamp ... on this pretty soon, it's farewell ... the high-flying anti-monopolist ... ples.

...the moment, the German Federal ... office is dealing with two major ... One is the Metro group of com... desire to increase its 25 per cent ... of Kaufhof AG; the other is the ... between the two purchasing ... nes, Selex/A & O and Tania.

...both cases, a joint turnover figure ... out DM18bn is involved.

...cartel office has not yet reached ... decision on the Metro/Kaufhof ... although it is expected to reject it. However, it has no objection to the merger between the two purchasing groups. And yet the resulting concentration of purchasing volume would be subject to the ban on cartelisation.

This is the crux of the problem. The amalgamation of demand factors of this scale runs the risk of enabling such demand groups to blackmail suppliers into granting them favourable supply terms. This would annual the criterion of performance-oriented competition.

Here, we are not just talking about discount. There are more favourable targets for such demands.

Many companies, for example, demand "entrance money" from the producer before he is allowed to supply his goods in the first place. In addition, special services are often asked for such as, storage rents, money for special events, return of "slow-selling" material, to mention just a few.

All this generally results from one single fact, namely the dominant market position of a trading enterprise with regard to its suppliers.

Both the cartel authorities at federal and State level are thus faced with the problem of how to prevent this concentration. They are also having trouble stopping forms of co-operation above and beyond the more visible merging activities.

The most recent amendment in 1980 did improve the situation somewhat, on company mergers.

Merger control now covers, for example, the acquisition of a medium-sized enterprises with an annual turnover of over DM4m (link-up merger), if this is expected to lead or strengthen a market dominant position.

The criteria laid down in the law for assessing what a market dominant position actually is have also helped when weighing up the pros and cons of major mergers in the trading sector.

Things start getting tricky when the market power on the demand side is not established via direct mergers but quite simply by co-operation. After all, mutual interests can be pooled without involving capital shares.

In such cases, the section of the law which stipulates that concentration covers everything which enables a particular firm to directly or indirectly exert a dominant influence on another firm could help out.

However, it is still uncertain whether, for example, joint purchasing by Metro/Kaufhof can be interpreted as concentration within the meaning of the Act.

Of all the problems in cartel law, concentration of power on the demand side is the biggest one.

For not only does such power mean that the suppliers can be thumb-screwed into favourable deals, but also that displacement competition will continue at the trading stage. In the end, the consumers themselves will have to foot the bill for this development.

Mammoth mergers à la Selex/Tania represent a perversion of the originally helpful idea behind such amalgamations, which were intended to give the smaller dealers a chance to make up lost ground against the purchasing benefits of department stores, chain stores and consumer markets.

If already large companies now merge to form giants, this will be the end of such well-meaning intentions.

The emergency brake to slow down such developments could be a decartellisation section in the legislation. However, legal experts still have their misgivingss about this.

Helmut Maier-Mannhart

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 June 1983)

The cartel office has always found it difficult to prove market-dominating enterprises guilty of illegally fixing market prices.

One of the most spectacular cases was the Valium case, in which the authority tried to force Hoffmann-La Roche to reduce its prices. The final decision was in favour of the company.

Recent court decisions confirm just how difficult it is to prevent abusive price-fixing practices.

Officially, a market-dominating company is not allowed to demand prices which are too high or too low.

In the former case, the position of power in the market is used to gain additional profits; in the latter, it is to eliminate competition.

Finding the right price requires a feel for market realities.

It is all the more surprising that the cartel judges at Berlin's Supreme Court are in fact making more and more decisions in favour of the consumer.

As an example of how things can happen: the cartel office wanted action taken against high-priced petrol at motorway stations.

But the court ruling was: the consumer knows the cost is higher. He can elect to tank up elsewhere.

To put it rather exaggeratedly, the consumer's idleness and stupidity are not, from the point of view of cartel law, worth protecting.

The Senate of the cartel office also decided that selling under cost price is not necessarily an abusive practice. This too, is a decision the clever consumer can accept.

So what is there left to do for those who try to prevent abusive price practices?

Those who mock this institution say that it is basically unsuitable for a market economy which works. For as long as competition reigns, market power cannot be misused to fix prices in the way many fear.

There is a lot of truth in this statement. In the case of petrol, for example, the independent petrol stations again and again managed via their price strategy to deliver a blow against the oil companies, despite the latters' market-dominating position.

The cartel office has not been able to

Price fixing difficult to prove

find one single case of abusive price practices, although this may have less to do with the facts of the situation than with the ability to find the evidence.

On the other hand, the repeated involvement of the office, its untiring probing, its questioning of which is the "right" price etc. have undoubtedly contributed towards making sure that competition works.

Although this was not the way such price monitoring was intended in the corresponding law, it's a good thing if (legal) theory is thus supplemented and enriched by practical experience.

The efforts by the authority to slow down the growing concentration within the economy would appear to be more important that such price control.

This field is perhaps even more complex than of checking on abusive price practices.

For here, the efforts by the official guarantors of competitive principles clash with the company-policy objectives of many enterprises to increase their market power.

However, theory is not always right here. Up to now, there has been no market segment in which a market-dominating enterprise has been able to dictate the prices.

In cases where this seemed possible in terms of financial power it was prevented by substitution competition.

For example, 90 per cent of the margarine market is in firm hands — however, the price is to a large extent determined in Brussels through their price increases for butter.

Nevertheless, despite the many difficulties in individual cases, the cartel office should maintain its admonishing and warning, questioning and criticising function.

The mere existence of Prof. Kartes and his team may discourage many of the major companies from being too cheeky.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 5 June 1983)

■ PERSPECTIVE

The day the workers rebelled in the workers' Garden of Eden



Bricklayers and building workers on sites along Stalin-Allee in East Berlin triggered the uprising of East German workers against what was claimed to be the first workers' and peasants' state on German soil.

They downed tools on 16 June 1953 in protest against a 10-per-cent increase in work norms. Then they marched to the House of Ministries in Leipziger Strasse to demand a reduction in their workload.

There they clamoured to see either the Party leader, Walter Ulbricht, or the Prime Minister, Otto Grotewohl.

Both preferred discretion to valour and sent out Fritz Selbmann, the Mining Minister, to deal with the demonstrators.

Suddenly political slogans were heard: calls for the resignation of the government and free elections. In less than 24 hours a wave of protest swept the entire country.

Social unrest

The 17 June 1953 popular uprising was the culmination of social unrest that had been accumulating for years in the GDR.

In 1952 the average monthly earnings were a mere DM308, but that was a princely amount in comparison with disability pensions that could be as low as DM65 a month.

The consumer goods industry was relegated to a back-seat role while steel and chemicals were given priority. Fat, meat and sugar were still rationed and many poor-quality consumer goods were too expensive for the ordinary working population.

Political justice was intensified to help establish socialism, with the result that political persecution forced more and more people to head west as refugees.

By the end of 1952 refugees were leaving the GDR at a rate of between 15,000 and 23,000 a month.

This crisis of the state was followed, on the death of Stalin, by a crisis in the Party, which had pursued an unswervingly Stalinist course.

The personality cult was maintained in the GDR long after the wind had changed in the Soviet Union and the struggle for succession was in full swing.

Walter Ulbricht even intensified the Stalinist policy line by having the Council of Ministers issues a decree disqualifying members of certain professions from being given ration cards.

They included practising lawyers, retail traders, tax accountants and house-owners. The prices of meat, sausages, bakery products and jam were increased.

Increasing pressure was exerted on the Protestant Church. Pupils and students who belonged to the Church youth organisation were sent down from school or university.

In April 1953 the Church youth organisation was banned. In the first six months of 1953 the number of refugees who headed west totalled 426,000.

The straw that broke the camel's back was the decision by the Party central committee on 14 May to introduce an across-the-board 10-per-cent increase in work norms.

This decision was reached after appeals for workers to agree voluntarily to higher norms had gone unheard. In April and May there were strikes at the Zeiss works in Jena and the Wilhelm Pieck copper combine.

Yet despite strikes in these and many other factories Party members resolved at a conference of activists to enlist the support of their brigades for a 15-per-cent increase in norms.

The increasingly volatile and critical nature of public opinion in the GDR had prompted the Soviet Control Commission to sound out opinion in the winter of 1952.

Its findings were not relayed to the Party, which made a point of circulating only jubilant reports.

The result was catastrophic. People showed no interest in the Party's work. The workers took a hostile view of decrees imposed from above.

On instructions from Moscow the Party politbureau proclaimed a new course on 9 June 1953 and admitted that the Party and the government had make mistakes.

Ration cards were reissued to everyone. Price increases were repealed. The expropriation of refugee property was to be waived for refugees who chose to return.

Court sentences were to be reviewed and cases of undue harshness rectified. State and Church were to be reconciled.

This change of course demonstrated the helpless uncertainty of a Party and Party officials who despite the communist credo that the Party was always right now had to admit that mistakes had been made.

The most serious mistake was their decision not to waive the increase in norms, which was felt to have been absolutely right.

As the workers saw it, however, the new course had only benefited the "capitalists," whereas their bonuses for overfulfilment of the norm had been steadily cut.

The party leadership did not make up its mind to go back on this decision until the eve of the uprising, but by then it was too late to stem the tide.

In the evening on 16 June a delegation of Stalin-Allee building workers called at the RIAS radio station in West Berlin to ask for their demands to be transmitted.

What they wanted was wages paid on the basis of the old norms, cuts in the cost of living, free and secret elections and freedom from punishment for the strikers.

That evening workers in East Berlin discussed the idea of holding a general strike the next day. In the early hours of 17 June tens of thousands of workers marched round various boroughs of West Berlin and from the Brandenburg Gate to Marx-Engels-Platz in East Berlin.

Their resentment could no longer be held in check. The uprising began to take shape as the first acts of violence occurred.

At 11 a.m. the crowds roared approval as the Red Flag was lowered from the Brandenburg Gate and torn to shreds.

In East Berlin workers ransacked Party offices and set newspaper kiosks on fire. The first Soviet tanks began to roll through the city streets.

The Russians sent reinforcements in and declared a state of emergency at 1 p.m. Demonstrations were [...] curfew was to be in force fro[m ...] 5 a.m. Meetings of more tha[n ...] ple were prohibited.

At 9 p.m. the streets were [...] the news spread from E[...] strikes and demonstrations [...] all over the country.

The main strike centres [...] trial areas such as Bitterfeld, Merseburg, Leipzig, Magde[burg] and Gera. Strikes were eve[n ...] Rostock and on the Baltic [...] Rügen.

The uprising was crushed [...] military assistance but a pow[er ...] ensued in the Party leaders[hip ...] fluential group in the politbu[reau ...] ed to oust Herr Ulbricht.

The Party regained interna[l ...] however, as it was able to [...] power being backed by the S[oviet mili]tary presence.

By September 1953 the [...] even in a position to announ[ce ...] increases in work norms.

What had happened was [...] out to have been a counter-re[volutiona]ry attempted putsch that had [...] under preparation at West[ern intelli]gence HQs.

This version is still the off[icial ...] account of what went on in [...] 30 years ago.

Literary clash

The uprising also triggered [...] clash. Bertolt Brecht had [...] the uprising and sent Walter [...] declaration of solidarity, but [...] able to stomach an appeal by [...] thel.

Barthel, who was First Se[cretary of] the GDR Writers' Associa[tion ...] an appeal entitled "How A[shamed I] Am" under his nom-de-plume [...]

"Are you as ashamed as I [...]" asked, "You are going to hav[e ...] very hard and behave very wi[...] ture if this disgrace is ever to [...] ten.

"Repairing houses that [...] destroyed is easy. Restoring [...] that has been destroyed is [...] hard."

Brecht penned a sarcastic [...] reply. Entitled "The Solution," [...]

"After the 17 June uprising [...] tary of the Writers' Association [...] lets distributed on Stalin-A[llee ...] claiming that the people ha[d ...] the government's confidence [...] only regain it by working twice [...]

"Would it not be easier fo[r the go]vernment to dissolve the pe[ople and] vote itself another?"

While Soviet machine-gun [...] cheted round the streets of [...] Bruno Leuschner, a politbure[au mem]ber, is said by an eye-witness [...] asked, his face pale:

"The socialist camp, led by [...] Union, to which we too belo[ng ...] sents the interests of the worke[rs ...] Can anyone tell me whose [...] been let today? Were they [...] who filled the streets today and [...] being strafed with gun fire?"

No-one answered. Despite [...] time it took to crush the upris[ing ...] a demonstration of power and [...] nation by the workers that wa[s ...] in Hungary in 1956, in Czech[oslovakia] in 1968 and in Poland today.

It continues to be a volatile [...] that weighs heavily on the [...] camp.

Günter [...]

(Rheinische Post, [...])

Idea of German reunification has not been discarded

KielerNachrichten

A recent opinion poll claims that only one West German in four still believes reunification will one day take place. If this finding is accurate, there would still be no cause for despondency and faint-heartedness.

Maybe it was because of the total collapse of the Reich in 1945 that West Germans over the past decades of reconstruction and recovery set aside ideas of reunification in favour of the striving for property and prosperity.

But it would be an act of self-denial if Germans in the Federal Republic were to abandon hope in view of the iron curtain between the ideological blocs and the slow pace of history.

Why should they give up the claim to reunification in peace and freedom merely because even in the medium term there is no likelihood of an improvement in the overall situation in Central Europe?

Political prospects of reunification unquestionably don't look promising at present, but it is illogical to infer from this fact that reunification is a total write-off.

Calls for 17 June to be scrapped as German Unity Day and replaced as a holiday by 23 May, the anniversary of Basic Law, the 1949 Bonn constitution, or 18 March, that of the 1848 revolution, imply in the final analysis that the division of Germany is final and irrevocable.

The GDR may have made it as difficult as possible to establish and maintain ties with East Germans, but visits are still possible.

If the idea of national unity is kept alive in the family, at school and by the media and others, the demand could assume political importance.

The 17 June 1953 popular uprising in the GDR is a constant reminder of this unnatural division and a symbol of intra-German solidarity.

Wolf Ullmann

(Kieler Nachrichten, 15 June 1983)

CLIMATE

Mystery of the vanishing carbon dioxide

Mannheimer MORGEN

[S]ummer last year was long and hot in Central and Western Europe. So, [ti]ll January, were autumn and winter. [Ab]normally so.

[M]eteorologists refer to an anomaly [whe]n for seven months in succession [the] weather is hotter than the average [fo]r a period of decades in an area of [rou]ghly 1,000 square kilometres.

[I]s there more to it than that? This [...]e householders breathed a sigh of relief when they saw their heating bills [an]d thought no more about it.

[I]n the 1960s it would have been an[oth]er matter. In those days the climate [an]d allegedly imminent climate catas[tro]phes were headline news.

Seven unusually hot months in a row [wo]uld have been viewed as conclusive [pr]oof that the increasing output of car[bon] dioxide was inexorably transform[in]g the atmosphere in the northern [he]misphere into a hothouse.

Self-appointed pundits felt it was not [...] possible but virtually inevitable that [an]y further increase in the carbon diox[ide] count in the atmosphere would lead [to] climatic catastrophe.

Our grandchildren, we were told, [wo]uld in all probability live in condi[tio]ns that would make it possible to [gr]ow coconut palms in the plains of [no]rthern Germany.

These forecasts were based on a lop[si]ded interpretation of the first compu[teri]sed climate forecasting in the United [St]ates.

The hothouse effect of the atmos[ph]ere was expected to be so intensified [by] a 100-per-cent increase in the carbon [di]oxide count that temperatures would [so]ar worldwide.

The average temperature throughout [the] year was expected to increase by [bet]ween two and three degrees centi[gra]de, and by four to five degrees in the [po]lar and sub-polar zones.

A fundamental shortcoming of these [fir]st forecasts was that the atmosphere [wa]s expected to remain dry and atmos[ph]eric humidity, which is always present in either gas or liquid form, was not borne in mind.

Professor Fritz Möller of Munich University had drawn attention several years earlier to the following point:

"The effects of an increase in carbon dioxide from 300 to 330 parts per million can be offset in full without any change in temperature.

"All that is needed is either a three-per-cent change in the amount of water vapour in the atmosphere or a one-per-change in cloud quantity.

"So the theory that climatic changes will be triggered by changes in the carbon dioxide count in the atmosphere is extremely doubtful."

He was referring to feedback effects that are extremely difficult to record.

If the atmosphere grows hotter, for instance, more water will evaporate and there will be more cloud. The cloud will provide greater cover from solar radiation and change the radiation make-up of the atmosphere.

Feedback of this kind may heighten an effect; it may also scale it down. In many cases scientists are not even sure how it works qualitatively, let alone quantitatively.

Professor Christian Junge, the former head of the department of atmospheric chemistry at the Max Planck Chemistry Institute in Mainz, was certainly right when he wrote that:

"Mankind is in the process of conducting a major, unintentional geochemical experiment, that of feeding back into the atmosphere in a short space of geological time the fossil fuels that have slowly accumulated over the past 500 million years, having taken shape via photosynthesis from atmospheric carbon dioxide."

What happens to all the carbon dioxide? That's what scientists are wondering too. Forecasts have grown much more cautious now new computer models have incorporated at least part of this feedback.

Comparison of the amount of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere and the actual increase has shown that only 35 per cent is still up there; the remaining 65 per cent is somewhere else.

Classical theory has it that roughly half this carbon dioxide is absorbed by the oceans and the biomass.

This is where an explanation attempted by Professor Hermann Flohn of Bonn University comes in. He outlined it in a paper read to the German Meteorological Association in Offenbach.

Recent research shows that the ocean's carbon dioxide intake capacity is not constant; it varies in accordance with surface water temperature.

Much more carbon dioxide seems to be absorbed when the extensive waters on either side of the equator grow colder.

This occurs, Professor Flohn says, when cold water surges up from the ocean depths, sending billions of micro-organisms, vegetable plankton, to the surface.

The plankton bring about a dramatic increase in the ocean's capacity to absorb carbon dioxide.

As Professor Flohn pointed out in the 7/81 issue of *Physikalische Blätter*, a scientific journal, this process is triggered by a hemispherical feedback when temperatures fall in the polar regions.

When temperatures fall up north (or down south) the ice and snow lines advance, the temperature gap between the equator and the polar regions widens, thermic circulation and wind speed increase and there is a greater upsurge of deep-sea water at the equator.

The accompanying decline in atmospheric water vapour and carbon dioxide count leads to a worldwide process of cooling-down that is especially marked in the polar areas, thereby bringing the feedback process round full-circle.

The increase in equatorial wind speed makes its mark on the trade winds. Once they slow down the entire process swings into reverse.

The upsurge of ocean water is reversed, with the result that surface water temperatures increase.

Professor Flohn's findings indicate that during cold spells the ocean absorbs about one billion tonnes, or roughly 20 per cent of the total current output of fossil carbon.

During hot periods it releases a corresponding amount of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.

Extremely complex processes are involved, and little is known about the complicated interaction between the ocean and the atmosphere.

A fair number of experts nonetheless believe that further research will not only find out what happens to the remaining carbon dioxide.

It will also make headway, possibly crucial progress, toward a solution of the problems of long-term weather forecasting.

Heinz Panzram/dl

(Mannheimer Morgen, 9 June 1983)

Lightning still strikes, but more leisurely

Eight people were killed by a single bolt of lightning in Austria when a raging thunderstorm sent them scurrying for cover under an oak tree.

That was a bad idea. There is even a proverb in German that says *Vor Eichen sollst Du weichen*, or Steer clear of oak trees.

Trees of any kind are the wrong place in a thunderstorm.

There has been a marked decline in the number of deaths from lightning all over Europe in the past few decades.

Summer thunder and lightning are more common in the mountains than by the sea. In the plains of northern Germany there are thunderstorms on 15 to 25 days a year, as against 25 to 35 down south.

There are roughly 50 thunderstorms a year in Munich as against a mere 15 or so in Kiel. Bavaria has the highest number of lightning accidents in Germany: 24 last year.

Elsewhere the average number is four or less, except in Schleswig-Holstein, where even though there is least thunder and lightning 10 accidents were surprisingly reported in 1982.

But that, say accident statisticians and research workers in Kiel, the state capital, was sheer coincidence.

Over the past 30 years there has been a striking decline in the number of lightning deaths in the Federal Republic of Germany.

In 1953 there were 44 lightning fatalities in the Federal Republic. In 1955 fifty-four people were struck by lightning and died as a result.

For the past 10 years the average number of lightning deaths in Germany has been eight. The decline is partly attributed to more people travelling by car and fewer walking or cycling.

The metal shell of the motor-car forms a Faraday's cage that conducts the lightning round its outer surface, thereby protecting the driver and passengers.

Last year there were 42 accidents in which people were killed or injured. All occurred outside. Two thirds were in open country or under trees.

Lightning is no respecter of trees. It is just a likely to strike at a beech as it is at an oak, even though another proverb counsels travellers to shelter under a beech tree.

Lightning strikes at tensions of up to 100 million volts, with current running at between 20,000 and 40,000 amperes in the main channel.

Yet despite the rumble or crash of thunder, the flash of lightning and these impressive figures, if a flash of lightning were harnessed it would only yield about 100 kilowatts.

That is roughly the amount of electricity a family of four uses in a fortnight or, put another way, a mere five-thousandth of the hourly output of a large coal-fired power station.

If you are caught in the open by a thunderstorm the best bet is to steer a wide berth of trees and make for a hollow in the ground.

Then go down on to your haunches and wait. Don't lie down and don't touch other people or animals. Keep a safe distance of several yards from metal of any kind.

Alfons Ohnütz

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 11 June 1983)

Key to why there are ice ages may lie out in space

[G]erman research findings seem to bear out longstanding assumptions [th]at the earth's climate is influenced, [pa]rtly and in the long term, by changes [in] the planet's orbit round the Sun.

A Yugoslav astronomer, Milutin Mi[lan]kovich, suggested as long ago as at [the] turn of the century that such chan[ge]s might account for successive ice [age]s and warmer periods.

His hunch is supported by the fin[din]gs of a research group coordinated [by] Professor Johann Michael [Gru]ntheim-Lotichius of Kiel University.

The group, who form part of a major [Ger]man climatic research programme, [ha]ve come up with high-grade data in[di]cating a surprisingly accurate corre[sp]ondence between ocean temperature [an]d solar radiation over the past [...]0,000 years.

In mathematical terms there is only a [ve]ry slight possibility that this correspondence might be merely coincidental.

If Milankovich's theory of an astronomically-triggered ice age rhythm were confirmed, future climatic trends (certainly those that depended on changes in our terrestrial orbit) could be calculated well in advance.

The scientists are analysing seabed sediment over the past three-and-a-half million years in a bid to chart a detailed history of the world's climate.

Their findings will, they hope, be of use in drawing up new climatic models and in long-range weather forecasting.

Prevailing sea water temperatures are inferred from the quantity of an oxygen isotope found in the calcified skeletons of marine organisms.

The oxygen 18 count is lower in warm water and higher in cold. But the strata of sediment plugs drilled from the seabed for analysis are difficult as a rule to allocate to any particular period in time.

This was less true of Core No. 13519, taken from the Sierra Leone ridge off the West African coast by the research vessel *Meteor*.

It is over 10 metres long, has undergone no displacement and in its lower-

Continued on page 10

■ AVIATION

Rickshaws for Taiwan or cattle for China, it's all air freight

The history of air freight is almost as old as that of aviation. Important items for special delivery have been airmailed round the world since the early years of the century.

Air freight is currently estimated to account for roughly three per cent of international goods traffic.

But this seemingly insignificant figure refers to the tonnage, not to the value of the goods carried, which is nearer 20 per cent of the total.

The main categories of goods sent by air include machinery, chemical and pharmaceutical products and electrical and electronic goods.

Just about everything has been flown, however, except for bulk cargoes.

Three years ago a complete hospital was flown from France to Zimbabwe. In India an airline has been known to take on rickshaws for Taiwan, then 20 live dolphins for customers in the Federal Republic of Germany.

German Cargo Services, a Lufthansa subsidiary that specialises in shipping animals, flew a killer whale from Frankfurt to Hong Kong in 1980. It recently flew 200 head of cattle to China.

Air freight is expensive but widely used by industry. It is swift and gets the goods to their destination in good shape.

The extra expense can be offset to some extent by savings in packaging and crating. Safety and low losses and wastage cut insurance costs.

So banks regularly air freight securities, gold and diamonds.

In 1982 air freight flown out of the Federal Republic totalled 417,000 tonnes, an increase of 0.5 per cent. Incoming air freight was down 4.3 per cent to 358,000 tonnes.

This drop is said mainly to have been due to economic recession.

Internationally, air freight totals roughly 14 million tonnes a year, and much of the credit must be given to aircraft manufacturers.

Thirty years ago the holds of large propeller aircraft could hold only about 10 tonnes of crates and bags.

Three times as much will fit into the holds of a fully-laden present-day jumbo jet: space-savingly arranged and often containerised.

In response to airline demand the manufacturers (Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Airbus Industrie) have developed both jumbo cargo planes and combination passenger and cargo aircraft

They carry passengers in one section of the main deck and freight in another. These hybrids, with their cargoes of passengers and containers, are used by some carriers on routes that would be uneconomic for passengers or freight alone.

Air freight rates are as varied and intricate as passenger fares are. The US open-skies policy has definitely led to lower rates.

Companies that fly freight only and were banking on continued expansion have been hard-hit as a result.

Cargolux, Flying Tigers and others have hit hard times because their planes were equipped for freight only and served fewer routes than passenger airlines.

In Germany and Europe it is usually cheaper to ship goods by road, rail or inland waterways than by air, possibly excepting perishable or fragile cargoes.

On intercontinental routes, say to or from North America or Asia, air freight can be cheaper than sending goods by ship.

This presupposes that every advantage is gained from the fierce competition between airlines. Rates in the same category often vary.

They are almost sure to vary from destination to destination and to depend on the size of the cargo. The outcome includes some strange anomalies.

A typical result of the air freight jungle is that it can cost no more to send goods across the North Atlantic than, say, from Germany to Spain.

Ground transhipment facilities are a key factor in determining whether air freight is economic. Satisfactory arrangements are expensive.

Specialised systems are needed to ensure swift on- and off-loading of containers and pallets.

Many airports are in serious trouble because they have to handle passengers, luggage and bulky items at the same terminals.

The 14,000-square-metre (3.5-acre) Lufthansa cargo centre at Frankfurt am Main shows how such problems can be solved.

It was opened last year after 12 years of planning and construction, rates having initially been ... ed.

It is claimed to be the la... most up-to-date air freight ... ment facility in the world. Its capacity is 425,000 tonnes a year.

The headlong growth in la... has made it uneconomic to ... overs to collect or deliver ... air freight is often not flown ... its destination.

It is cheaper to fly it to a ... freight centre and then forw... road or rail to its destination.

This combination has enab... airlines to offer very low rates ... routes.

It may be worth the sender's ... send air freight by road to Lu... or Belgium and have it flo... there. Air freight flown from ... land can sometimes be chea... from Germany too.

From 500kg air cargo from ... land to South Africa costs DM6.50 per kilo. From Ger... costs DM11.

Lufthansa board chairma... Ruhnau stressed at the Press co... he gave to mark publication of ... line's annual accounts that the ... business still waiting to be do... freight.

Exports might be declining ... but they were increasing in w... said. So freight rates were no lo... overriding consideration they ... be.

Sending goods by air freight ... tie up capital for us long as ... them by sea did, and that weig... heavily than cheaper rates ... exporters.


Herr Ruhnau also mentio... growing division of labour ... tional companies, which ... ship parts fast from one facto... other in different countries.

All in all, air freighters took ... mistic view of the outlook.

Air freight still had much ... make in gaining confidence ... whereas in the United States ... lots or individual items were ... freight as a matter of course.

Klaus ...

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, ...)



Continued from page 9

most section testifies to a change in pole of the earth's magnetic field.

In the palaeomagnetic time scale this change is known as the Brunhes-Matuyama event and is felt to have occurred about 730,000 years ago.

Radiometric dating of the uppermost section of the core showed it to be about 150,000 years old.

Despite these fairly definite dates the intermediate sections of the core could not be evenly divided and dated accordingly.

Seabed sediment had accumulated evenly over the past 750,000 years or so but part of the lime from the original sediment had been dissolved out during cold spells.

So its original quantity had to be reassessed before a reliable time scale could be drawn up.

Only then was a comparison possible, and it showed a surprising degree of correspondence between astronomical solar radiation and ocean temperatures at any given time.

The sediment also revealed further details of climatic changes from ice ages to warmer spells and vice-versa.

Lime started to be dissolved out of the seabed sediment thousands of years before the ice age was at its coldest, presumably because deep-sea Antarctic water headed further and further ...

This it was able to do becau... thern waters were already clad ... layer of ice that prevented the ... nishment of reserves of deep-sea water.

There was thus nothing to s... tide of Antarctic waters flowing ...

Course-grained desert dust fr... Sahara continued to be blown ... Atlantic for long after the peak of ... age.

This will have been because ... south winds continued to blow f... shrinking expanses of inland ice.

These deep-sea data on ocean ... ratures in the geological past may ... crucial importance for long-range ... ther forecasting, but they cannot ... put to any real use.

No-one knows yet which ... ages and warmer periods corresp... specific ice ages and inter... periods on dry land.

There is no way in which co... ice ages can yet be accurately d... detailed deep-sea data cannot b... to forecast continental climatic ... ces, especially glacier movements.

This is an extremely tricky asp... should keep scientists busy for ... time yet.

Dr Harald Ste...

(Mannheimer Morgen, ...)

THE ARTS

Fassbinder case: creativity and drugs conundrum

Munich film-maker Rainer Werner Fassbinder, who died last year ... 36 of cocaine poisoning, never ... any secret of his taste for narco...

... made the point clearly in his self-... trayal in the 1978 film *Deutschland ... Herbst*. Dr Felix Tretter, writing in ... latest issue of *Deutsches Ärzteblatt*, ... medical journal, wonders whether ... is any link between drugs and ... tivity.

... an article entitled Fassbinder the ... Genius: Creativity via Drugs? he ... cludes that there is none.

Fassbinder, he writes, would have ... a genius regardless whether he ... drugs or not. If he had not, he ... ht of course have lived to accom... h even more.

Dr Tretter works at a psychiatric cli... His aim in writing the article was to ... pose the widespread tendency in cer... arts sectors to claim that drug-tak... is indispensable.

Rock groups, for instance, tend to ... narcotics are a must, and many ... ple subscribe to the dangerous view ... drugs boost creativity.

Fassbinder did too. Dr Tretter quotes ... as saying in 1980 that he was con... ed Rimbaud's creative period was ... ly due to marihuana.

Proust, he felt, had only been able to ... te his *A la recherche du temps perdu* ... rough taking some drug or other.

Freud was also said to have been able ... make certain discoveries while under ... influence of cocaine.

"All told I should say," he said, "that ... influence of drugs could well be a ... itive one on the arts."

Marcel Proust, 1871-1922, died aged ... The fifth part of his novel did not ... pear until three years after his death.

Jean Arthur Rimbaud, 1854-1891, ... d at 37. But his poems were written ... between 1870 and 1873.

Fassbinder died at 36. Dr Tretter is of the opinion that by 1980, when he gave the interview just quoted, he was no longer capable of controlling his drug consumption.

"This mistaken opinion had fatal consequences," he writes. Fassbinder was a case of polytoxicomania, a user of several drugs simultaneously.

He is said to have taken cocaine intensively from 1976. Some time earlier he had come into contact with hashish and used uppers and downers to keep his feelings under control.

Alcohol and nicotine had been important drugs for Fassbinder since youth.

Dr Tretter does not rule out the possibility of having good ideas under the influence of drugs, "but it has dreadful consequences; for days afterwards the chemistry of the brain is in total disarray."

He is strongly opposed to what he calls the glorification of the effect of drug-taking that is even encountered in scientific literature.

"On the one hand the drug-related tragedy of the usually short lives of creative people who have taken drugs, at least for a while, is stressed.

"On the other, work by, say, Freud that is reputed to have been done in connection with drug-taking is usually simply described as impressive, with no further critical consideration.

"There is seldom any comparison made between the innovational value of such work and the quality of work done in periods of slight or zero drug consumption.

"In this way it is easy to gain the impression that hard drugs hold the key to a shorter but more intensive creative life."

Dr Tretter proves his point in a chronology of Fassbinder's creativity. In 17 years Fassbinder made 40 films and also wrote, producted, acted and worked as a stage director.



The late Rainer Werner Fassbinder . . . drug taking out of control.

(Photo: Rudolf Diedrich)

There were, Dr Tretter writes, four periods in Fassbinder's life when he went through a particularly creative phase.

The first, he argues, began in 1969 when Fassbinder hit the headlines with his melodrama about the life of a migrant worker, *Katzelmacher*.

It won him a TV award and the Federal film award in gold for the screenplay and his work as director and producer of the film.

During this first burst of creativity Fassbinder is said to have acted seven parts, directed six plays, made seven films and written two radio plays and a screenplay.

Dr Tretter lists 23 creative activities, a total he never again reached in such a short period. He was 23 and probably at his creative peak.

The second period is said to have been in 1972 and 1973 and to have comprised nine films and three plays. It was arguably the time at which his creativity as a film-maker was at its peak.

They included *Angst essen Seele auf* (Fear Eats the Soul), premiered in March 1974, the tale of a love affair between an ageing German charlady and a migrant worker from Morocco.

His film version of Theodor Fontane's novel *Effi Briest* was also a major success.

The third period, from 1975 to 1976, included seven very distinctive films, such as *Satansbraten*, but none of them were very successful.

In 1977 Fassbinder's creative fortunes were at a low ebb. He made only three films and at one stage planned to move to Hollywood.

The fourth and final phase lasted until his death on 10 June 1982. It included his 13-part serialised TV version of Alfred Döblin's 1920s novel *Berlin Alexanderplatz* and his box-office success *Lili Marleen*.

It also included films such as *Deutschland im Herbst* and his final film, *Querelle*.

"This final creative period," Dr Tretter writes, "included increasing uniformity of films in form and content . . . Several critics took a dim view of the aesthetics of his last films, so he cannot be said to have reached a pinnacle in his career as a film-maker during this final stage."

A further point Dr Tretter feels worth mentioning is that the team he worked with for so many years grew increasingly capable, with the result that Fass-

Continued on page 12

Showing the 20th Century as it really wasn't

Monumenta 83, a DM7.5m, two-hour spectacular screened at the ... falenhalle in Dortmund begins ... the festive atmosphere one tends ... associate with New Year's Eve.

Champagne corks fly, churchbells ... and rockets streak into the night ... The year 1900 is celebrated on ... king-sized screens simultaneously.

The two hours that follow are des... ed by the organiser, Bodo Haren... as a chronicle of the 20th century. ... ws will differ on whether it was a ... rthwhile investment.

Audiences are sent through 80 years ... recent history at a flying pace that ... belies the claim that the program... is a chronicle of historical events.

Documentary footage is not from all ... the world. It is mainly German. America and Russia are occasionally ... ntioned, but China is not. The story ... the Third Reich is missing.

The arts fare little better. Music is co... ed solely by Elvis Presley and the ... tles. Films are reduced to Charlie ... aplin and Marilyn Monroe.

The graphic arts are condensed to ... casso, while literature, if the Dort... und spectacular is any guide, has by-passed the 20th century entirely.

Worse still, history is seen as a se... uence of events and presented accordingly. Structural phenomena go unnoticed.

The evolution of basic rights or the trade unions, the role of the Catholic and Protestant churches, women's lib or changes in leisure pursuits go unmentioned.

There is naturally not enough time to convey an anywhere near distinctive idea of what are claimed to be the 40 highlights of the century.

A few shorts are all the attention that is paid to Revolution in Germany, Léon Trotsky and John McCloy, to name but three.

As there is no inclination to engage in analysis the audience learn nothing about why Hitler came to power or why, for instance, the United States fought in Vietnam.

There is not even a gleaning to be gained from the DM10 catalogue, which is a poor accompaniment to the whirl of images.

Despite these drawbacks the aim, according to Harenberg, is "to make history tangible for people who want to know why what happened happened and what we can learn from it."

All the audience gets is a few calculated sensations.

Three screens featuring different pictures and soundtracks illustrate the various topics, but the effect is not to provide an informative and illuminating contrast as occasionally intended.

One's eyes constantly wander from one screen to another in a bid to miss nothing worthwhile.

On the left there is the Tsar and Tsarina, on the right Lenin in exile and in the middle the suffering soldiers in the field.

It is literally a sight for sore eyes and a strain not only on the neck muscles but also on powers of concentration.

The spectacular can certainly not be termed serious. Instead of an allegedly competent review of the century we are fed merely fine words.

If the organisers are to be believed wh should be constantly amazed by what is billed as the event of the century, a unique sound and screen documentation and in every respect a sensation.

Monumenta 83, which threatens to feature further reviews of history in the years to come, somewhat typically claims to have the largest poster in the world.

It is surely surprising that the chronicle of the 20th century should be on offer with 17 years of the century still to go.

The idea was based on a book of the same title, and the organisers evidently wanted to market their version as soon as possible, come what might in the remaining years of the century.

To give the audience at least some sensation of what the future may hold in store, the final scene, backed up by laser rays and disco fog, features a time tunnel.

What the tunnel then reveals is less informative than the message screened in gigantic letters just beforehand.

"You", they proclaim, "are the 20th century." Monumenta 83 certainly isn't.

Martin Ohlen

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 9 June 1983)



■ SOCIETY

The foreign influences that go to make up the modern Germany

During the recent CDU party congress in Cologne, Germans were warned about an alleged danger of a "national and cultural" loss of identity.

The speaker was Alfred Dregger, chairman of the party's parliamentary party. His language fitted in with the motto of the congress, which was: Let's change things, now!

Dregger was thinking about the millions of Turks in Germany as he spoke.

For him, "the protection of the national and cultural identity of our nation by limiting the number of foreigners from alien culture groups" is one of the big tasks facing at least conservative politicians.

A disturbing and unfortunate turn of phrase. Particularly since this kind of talk will back up all those in Germany who think in the black and white terms such as "alien" and "native". And there are plenty who do.

Such words of warning can arouse notions which have slumbered for many years. The choice of words could have been more careful.

Mistrust and xenophobia lie dormant in many minds.

Dregger's party colleagues expressed their gratitude for his forthright statements by applauding him strongly.

After all, he had differentiated his words somewhat by offering them a kind of cultural priority list. Austrians, Swiss and even those from South Tyrol (!)are welcome to "settle down in *our midst*". *Indeed, they represent an* "enrichment".

Even Italians, Spaniards, Poles and French are welcome, providing they have become assimilated, as they belong to the "Christian culture group".

Moslems, i.e. the non-Occidentals, do not, however, fit into Dregger's picture unless they are "integrated and assimilated".

What did the former Lord Mayor of Fulda mean when he spoke of the "cultural identity of our nation"? Religion, perhaps, or language, morals, art, philosophy, everyday (and Sunday) life — the whole cultural civilisation of central Europe?

And what does "identity" mean in this context?

Anyone who thinks seriously about cultural phenomena, relations and stimulations will soon find that he must ban such concepts as "identity" into the realm of culturally chauvinist illusion.

The artificially created contrast, "cultural identity" here and "alien culture group" there, is just as invalid for Germany as it is for other European and non-European countries.

Openness has always produced the best cultural achievements, whereas protectionism and delimitation — both expressions of weakness — have led to isolation, incest and finally to desolation.

The large numbers of Islamic worshippers in Germany have led to greater social friction. However, to insist on the "cultural identity of our nation" would only exacerbate problems.

Anyone who sets up barriers does nothing to help improve the relations between social groups.

Lively discussion, on the other hand, can remove barriers and in the long run do more to enrich cultural life in Germany.

This also applies to those — whether Turks or Germans — who do not feel that they belong to their country's "intellectual elite".

Culture takes place and develops at all levels, not only at the so-called "higher" ones.

It's much too early to judge what the confrontation between the German industrialised society and the immigrant Turks will mean for the identity of both groups. There are many religious and educational problems involved.

One thing is certain: culture withers if barriers are set up against everything which is "alien".

The Goths moved to the West, the Teutons to the South, the Romans found their way to the Mediterranean, as did the Greeks. The Arabs left their cultural marks in Spain and Italy. The Turks once got as far as Vienna, now they're in Wanne-Eikel.

The history of the peoples of this world is the history of inter-mingling. No-one knows this better than those who come from Germany's Rhineland.

Carl Zuckmayer once wrote of them: "They were some of the best, my friend! The best in the world!

"And why? Because they are a mixture. The peoples have mingled, just like the waters from the springs, brooks and rivers flow together into a mighty torrent."

This kind of mixture leads to the "identities" of the living present.

A century later, Hermann Hesse wrote: *Der Weltgeist will nicht fesseln uns und engen / Er will uns Stuf' um Stufe heben, weiten* (The Weltgeist seeks not to limit and bind us/it lifts us step by step, extends our understanding).

And hasn't the Orient extended our understanding, that includes Germany's, over the past thousand and more years? *Ex oriente lux.* Let us look for "orientation".

Christianity, for example, is reputedly of Oriental origin. Where does incense come from, oil and ... thing which belongs to the cult?

Where do we find the source of Medieval minnesong, the gay ... culture, falconry, medicine, ... East, young man!

Where does paper originate? China. We use Arabic numerals ... with its "fairy-tale" beauty is ... vable without the influence ... Orient.

The architectural brilliance ... da, all of Oriental origin. The ... dening, with its fountains, ... roses and narcissi.

The Crusaders brought us ... and jewels, fabrics, spices, ... They ate ginger, honey and ... cakes *(Printen)*, marzipan and ... syrup and rock candy.

Even the venerable imperial ... man" eagle was imported ... "alien" culture.

Just as were the Turkish cre... fee, mocha, alchemy, scien... tales, 1001 Nights.

What would there be left of ... tural identity" if it were not ... Orient?

It is no coincidence that ... paradise is associated with the ... and its myths.

Nobody would have been ... sualise the Golden Era is ... Nebelheim. Not even the ... Romantics.

Cultural identity of our nation ... The more we open ourselves ... others, remove barriers, borders ... that which is "alien", the sooner ... come to understand that culture ... world are identical.

Werner ...

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger ...)

Exhibition reveals suffering of art under Third Reich

At least one visitor to the exhibition "Art in Hamburg beneath the Swastika" found nothing wrong with the type of harmony and beauty encouraged officially by the National Socialists.

This was the gist of his remarks in the book for visitors' comments.

The next visitor commented on that comment by writing: "Missed the Point".

Did the first visitor really miss the point? The second was right. Yet the first visitor *felt* just like millions did during the Third Reich about what the Nazi regime was doing to art in the name of "popular sentiment".

"Degenerate" was the opposite of such healthy public feeling, the label which led to the persecution and banning of many artists.

In 1962, as the defamation exhibition "Degenerate Art" celebrated its 25th 'anniversary', there was a special review in Munich of the destruction of art by the Nazis.

Now, 50 years after the fateful year 1933, a number of towns and cities remind us of these acts of crime by the Nazi state. As in Hamburg in the *Kunsthalle*, there is a special exhibition on the occasion of the Church congress in Hanover ("Dictatorship in Art in the Third Reich", *Kunstverein*).

Anyone who wanders through other exhibitions in Hamburg and Hanover will find art which would have been and perhaps still is regarded as "degenerate" by "popular sentiment" and by the Nazi judges at the time. More so at any rate than the harmless Cubists and Expressionists.

The Hamburg Art Association is showing "Pictures of Death in Contemporary Art", including the controversial Beuys object "Show Your Wounds."

In the St. Katharine Church there is provocative contemporary presentations of the Last Supper.

Both exhibitions, unfortunately, will not receive the attention given the exhibition in Hanover.

The *Kunsthaus* in Hamburg and the Galery Luchte on the Jung... (Hamburg) present drawings, ... sculptures by Alfred Hrdlicka ... Art Museum in Hanover the "... ma Cycle" from Arnulf Rainer.

The Sprengel Museum is ... alone would represent an unpa... collection of "degenerate" art.

What am I trying to say? ... freedom of art, the possibility of ... confrontation with life and ... cially guaranteed here, still ha... against spoon-feeding and ...

The ostracism of artists is ... symptom of the oppression of ... groups.

This is corroborated by other ... tions such as "Church between Cross and the Swastika" in Han... "As Hamburg 'Awoke' — Every... in Nazi Germany" in Hamburg's ... *thaus*.

The "Art in Hamburg beneath the Swastika" exhibition will be ... with a protest document against ... Josef Strauss.

The Director of the Art Gal... Hamburg, Werner Hoffmann, ... point: "1983 will go down as the ... which the lack of political insti... led to the new use of the fatal wo... generate', this time recoined ... current situation."

Herbert G...

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt ...)

Continued from page 11

binder stood a good chance of doing even better.

The writer quotes Fassbinder himself ("I am often overwhelmed by sadness and have not the slightest idea why") and biographies of him in which mention is made of "dissolute homosexual practices, drug-taking excesses, squabbles, intrigues and punch-ups."

He feels Fassbinder must have been a depressive personality, although creative depression and exhaust depression (as in the final stage of making a film) may have played a part in his depressiveness.

Cocaine, the drug that took his life, was for a limited period a useful antidepressant, Dr Tretter argues. It is an argument that is plausible and makes sense in psychopharmacological terms.

The result was probably that as the effect wore off he grew increasingly depressive and was plunged into the vicious circle of addiction.

Fassbinder planned to make a film version of Pitigrilli's novel *Cocaine*. "It is not a film for or against the drug," he said in an interview.

"It is a film about an individual who is in a position to decide freely for or against the drug while being clearly aware that to decide in favour is to live a shorter but more intensive life.

"It is up to the individual to decide whether he would sooner live shorter but more intensively or longer and in a more conventional manner."

"Fassbinder," Dr Tretter writes, "was unfortunately unable to break with the drug. Might he not have preferred to live more intensively and longer if he had really been as free to decide, 'with a clear consciousness,' as he claimed?"

Karl Heinz Reger

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 11 June 1983)

■ EDUCATION

Graduate unemployment a worsening problem

The trend toward university education in the Federal Republic of Germany is unbroken. Graduates as a proportion of the working population increased from 2.9 per cent in 1961 to over 6.1 per cent today.

This figure, based on research by the ... of Christian Democratic Students, is expected to increase to between 10 and 12 per cent by the turn of the century.

The labour force is likely to remain steady, subject only to cyclical fluctuations, at around 26 million throughout the period.

Three results of the trend are already clearly emerging. The first is tougher competition resulting in jobs going to more highly qualified applicants.

The second is a new range of employment opportunities for graduates and the third an alarmingly high rate of graduate unemployment that has assumed the proportion of a political problem.

Statistics lead one to expect the situation to worsen until well into the 1990s.

The main feature of the age structure of the German population, the student report says, is a drastic decline in the number of people up to the age of 20.

In 1975 they made up 28 per cent of the population; by 1990 they will be down to 20.5 per cent.

The proportion of 20- to 45-year-olds, whose numbers include young graduates, will increase by roughly four per cent to 37.2 per cent.

Over the past 20 years the number of students in the Federal Republic of Germany has nearly quadrupled: from ...000 in 1960 to 1.1 million in 1981.

By the end of the decade they should number over 1.3 million.

The number of schoolchildren in a given year who went on to university (or took university entrance qualifications) used to be a steady six per cent.

It has now increased to 23 per cent and is expected to rise to between 34 and 38 per cent in the 1990s.

Theodor Berchem only recently revealed that an entire range of measures to cope with problems on the graduate labour market has been tried out without lasting success.

Professor Berchem will take over in August as chairman of the Standing Council of West German University Vice-Chancellors.

An efficient solution presupposes, he says, that the problem is not merely papered over or palmed off on to other sectors.

It must really be tackled with a view to all possible repercussions. The entire educational system must be made as flexible as possible from the bottom up.

At as many points as possible and as many levels as possible it must be possible to branch out or establish a vocational qualification.

The first step Professor Berchem proposes is to reduce both the length of time it takes to complete a university course and the number of years spent at school before gaining university entrance qualifications from 13 to 12.

"Apart from the Federal Republic of Germany," he says, "as far as I know only Italy and a handful of Swiss cantons allow themselves the luxury of 13 years at school."

Add to this an average of five to six years at university and graduates in the Federal Republic will be seen, at 25 at least, to be definitely older than their counterparts elsewhere.

Professor Berchem outlined his further proposals in *Hochschulpolitische Informationen*, a higher education policy review.

After the 12th year of conventional schooling he would like to see students take a specialised 12-month pre-university course.

It would offset the loss of the final school year and prepare students for university education in much the same way as used to be done in France, for example.

They would take a final exam qualifying them for university study, which would then come more easily than the present transition from school to university.

The first two years at university as envisaged by Professor Berchem would be a general course entitling students who pass to take up certain careers or embark on other, non-university courses leading to career qualifications.

Depending on examination performance he envisages three options from this point onward:

● The student fails to pass the exam despite the opportunity of retaking it and then leaves university.

● The student's pass grade does not entitle him to further study. He is awarded a diploma and may be allowed to take a further academic degree, but will then leave university with a career qualification.

● The pass grade is good enough to entitle the student to carry on at university to examinations comparable with the present degree finals.

Discounting military service the graduate would be 21 on taking his first university exams and could embark on a career in the public service or private enterprise at a much earlier age then today's graduates.

Above all, he would do so without having invested an inordinate amount of time and economic wastage in this education.

Students who stayed on at university would, like their French counterparts, graduate at roughly 23.

Professor Berchem admits that at first glance this arrangement would seem to hit hard the students who were sent down after their first exams.

But, as he puts it: "If there is to be a process of selection that relieves the burden on the universities and spares those affected the difficulties they would otherwise face two or three years later this procedure seems to me more humane than the current intermediate exam that leaves the student empty-handed if he fails it and has to leave university."

His proposals must be seen against the background of more than one school-leaver in three gaining university entrance qualifications by the mid-1990s.

If this happens, he (and by no means he alone) concludes, changes will be indispensable at school and university, and the sooner they are introduced the better.

Peter Philipps

(Die Welt, 8 June 1983)

Less red tape, smaller schools wanted

Smaller, more intimate schools and less red tape are envisaged in a report compiled by an independent educational study group in the Rhineland-Palatinate.

Mainz University educationalist Heinz Bach in presenting the report said its proposals were aimed at enabling schools to gain immunity from the stranglehold of red tape and to develop educational yardsticks of their own.

Schools with more than 30 classes ought, he felt, to be avoided as a prerequisite:

● for sufficiently intensive social orientation by pupils;

● for the encouragement of contacts between individuals;

● and to pave the way for lasting ties among pupils, betwen teachers and pupils, among teachers, among parents and between parents and teachers.

The number of optional subjects should be reduced so as to keep classes intact and to allow them todevelop a sense of security.

Until their tenth year at school pupils ought to spend at least two thirds of their lessons together as a class, and thereafter at least a third.

Dr Bach feels it is important for pupils to feel they have a classroom of their own. This sense of "ownership" tends to prevent vandalism.

The system of form masters must, he feels, be retained to ensure a steady educational relationship. This apparently would mean staff would need to be qualified to teach more than two subjects.

He calls to mind with approval the old custom of teachers visiting their pupils' homes. Special counselling facilities should be provided: not to make the teacher's job easier but to promote educational ties with his pupils.

More intensive cooperation between teachers is expected to make them critically conscious members of staff with greater educational leeway and less susceptibility to alien influences.

Dr Bach made it clear that the group, which wa set up in 1974, wanted neither a return to small and inadequate village schools nor a return to the past in general.


Education Minister Gölter of the Rhineland-Palatinate agreed with the report inasmuch as after what school had been through over the past 15 years a stage of consolidation was needed.

That was why the Rhineland-Palatinate had encouraged schools to assume responsibility by arranging 10 per cent of lessons as they saw fit.

In at least part of the curriculum they were no longer bound by strict guidelines. But he was unable to take up the report's proposal to make part-time teaching posts full-time and temporary appointments permanent.

This, the Minister argued, ran counter to labour market policy requirements. Dr Bach and his commission remain convinced that the teacher's educational task calls for full-time commitment.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 8 June 1983)



There is no such thing in the Federal Republic of Germany as a specialist for "intensive" medical treatment.

If most doctors have their way, this is not likely to change in the immediate future. They are against further fragmentation and sub-division of interdisciplinary aspects of medicine.

This does not mean that there is no need for special branches of research and discussion on these subjects.

A recent international symposium on the problems facing emergency and intensive medicine provided an opportunity for experts to air their opinions.

This was the fourth meeting of its kind organised in alternation each year by a joint work-group made up of medical experts from Münster and Munich. This time there were participants from 16 countries.

Professor Peter Lawin from the Clinic for Anaesthesiology and Operative Intensive Medicine at the Westphalian Wilhelms University in Münster and Professor Klaus Peter from the Ludwig Maximilians University in Munich had chosen the subject "Machine Respiration Past — Present — Future" as the leitmotif for the congress.

It was confirmed that more technological and mechanical complexity with regard to the respiration machines only holds promise of therapeutic success in about 15 per cent of cases treated.

The price paid for such success, which all too often shows the dehumanised side of medicine, is public criticism of the motto *in dubio pro vita*, which in many cases is too rigidly respected.

The medical experts argue against such criticism and show that they too have learnt a great deal from the overall discussion on intensive-care treatment.

The sedation that is, the medicinal quietening-down of the lung patient during short-term or long-term therapy is no longer regarded as the ultimate.

■ MEDICINE

Doctors breathe deep over the success syndrome

There is reference to the weakening of the lung's musculature via sedation. Doctors, therefore, now prefer the patient to consciously experience the illness and consciously support its cure.

There is a growing awareness among medical experts of the importance of psychological care and support.

In a special study-group on the back-up measures to respiration treatment, the representatives of the nursing staff introduced a further aspect.

For those who look after the patients, an alert and responsive patient is more "attractive", or at least receives greater attention and care. This in turn has a positive effect on the healing process.

What trends have been observed by the medical experts from the USA, Poland, West Germany, East Germany, Australia, Sweden or the Netherlands, to mention just a few countries represented at the congress?

Professor Lawin referred to the enormously "dramatic" developments in the field of artificial respiration techniques since the iron lung was constructed by the New York physiologists, Drinker and Shaw, in 1929.

Its pump was able at the time to develop a water column of up to 60 centimetres of positive or negative pressure, at a frequency of between 10 and 40 a minute.

In Germany, the Dräger iron lung was used frequently during the polio epidemics of the fifties.

However, this method was no solution to the problems of long-term respiration. New methods of cannulation of the airways paved the way for the now accepted and standardised approach of positive compression respiration.

Research in recent years has not been satisfied with developments. In too many cases, the lung turned out to be the "target organ" for other illnesses (for example peritonitis or the effects of delayed shock).

Without treatment of the primary illness, therapeutic sucess was unattainable.

The "aggressive," i.e. heavy-pressure treatment of such secondary symptoms, medical experts talk of the adult respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), would only continue damaging the lungs. This may then result in fistulae or tearing of the lung.

Experts at the congress primarly see two "alternatives" for respiration treatment in future: extracorporeal circulation and high-frequency respiration.

The first approach to treatment was prepared by the German pioneer of heart-lung therapy, Prof Lunkenheimer, and represented by Dr. Gattinoni from Milan.

It's aim is to replace lung respiration by means of an artificial exchange of gas in the patient's blood outside of the patient's body.

This mechanical artificial circulation using a heart-lung machine requires a great deal of mechanical apparatus and nursing personnel. It is also problematic with regard to possible d the red blood corpuscles and infection and should only be in the most serious cases.

High-frequency treatment, other hand, sounds much saf experimentally backed.

The principle here is based ing the normal respiration fre 10 to 20 per minute by a fre quency with a corresponding of the volume of air involved.

The result: the individual haled is less, the medium breathing is constant and the tion is stabilised.

The internationally unique computer-controlled program loped in Münster also offers fits. Highly-complicated elect terial, about the size of two allows a synthetic breathing to be established, which is lored to the individual need patient.

Hermann Schmi

(Frankfurter Rundschau,

Why hospit have becom health facto

Rapid and sweeping cha turned friendly hospitals health factories.

The operation theatres hav into sterile and perfectionist

Perhaps it was inevitable th thing became more modern, gantic and more expensive.

But what about human be only thing which seems to human body and not a pers ings. The body has to be cure

However, the answer is not demn medical and technolog gress altogether.

Such hospitals were creat main by public demand for be ment.

A sick person should be able on receiving the best treatment was the line of thinking.

Most people believe that "the modern the hospital, the be treatment."

So it is the patients who must their ways. They must begin that a comforting doctor is m valuable than expensive medic ratus.

Wolfga

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten,

Despair drives more children to kill themselves

Every fourth German child has at some time toyed with the idea of committing suicide. The number who actually do is rising.

According to calculations by the Director of the Würzburg University clinic for Child and Youth Psychiatry, Professor Gerhard Nissen, suicides by children aged between 10 and 15 increased by almost 25 per cent between 1971 and 1981.

The increase was 10 per cent over the same period for teenagers between 15 and 20.

The suicide figure for youngsters has increased at a much faster rate than for adults, says the child safety committee in Munich.

Between 1971 and 1981, suicides by adults rose by 5.5 per cent.

In a survey on depressive children, Nissen discovered that of the one in four children and teenagers who had thought about committing suicide, 50 per cent had actually attempted it.

He warns: "Every attempted suicide by a child or a teenager, even if is is almost playfully and superficially carried out, represents a signal which should be taken seriously."

A disturbing picture is presented by official suicide statistics. The number of suicides among children in 1981 increased to 105 (78 in the previous year). The number of teenager suicides rose from 425 (1980) to 544 in 1981.

Suicide is the fourth most frequent cause of death among children, and indeed the second most frequent among teenagers.

Professor Nissen also pointed out how difficult it is sometimes to distinguish between a genuine suicide attempt and an accident. This would suggest that the real number of suicides is much higher.

Suicide attempts symptoms were a social illness created by society itself.

Suicide rates have traditionally been the highest in West Germany, East Germany, Switzerland, Sweden and Hungary, regardless of the political system in these countries.

Even drug abuse can be regarded as "long-term (self-) poisoning," i.e. as a chronic suicide attempt, Nissen emphasised.

Many attempts to commit suicide were marked by demonstrative and serious elements, so that they become a kind of "Russian roulette."

There are age-specific differences in the choice of the means to commit suicide.

Boys and youths show greater aggressivity in the choice of their suicidal "weapons," whereas the girls and young women prefer less brutal methods.

Most young males die via hanging, strangulation or suffocation, whereas the young females more frequently take poison.

The fact that many suicides were due to depressions was reason enough for Nissen to demand greater treatment for suicide-prone children and teenagers.

Above all, the prevention of psychological misdevelopments and a more careful psychiatric diagnosis are steps in the right direction. They should be backed by more advisory services for parents and help in individual cases.

The ability to judge whether a young person is likely to commit suicide is one of the most difficult tasks facing a doctor.

Fridolin Engelfried

(Nürnberger Nachrichten, 7 June 1983)

■ MODERN LIVING

Acrid smell of arson clogs insurance nostrils

rance was invented to provide er against the vagaries of lightnd the elements. Nowadays naturs a relatively minor role in the insurance business.

emphasis is on man-made damincluding a category that is increasy leaps and bounds: deliberate such as arson and theft.

insurance has long been mainly er of arson, with no statistical difce being drawn between cases in the claimant himself set fire to operty (or had it set fire to) and in which a third party was the iser.

chever way you look at it, they criminal offences.

981 the statutory fire insurance in urg found 30 per cent of claims ses of arson and a further 50 per ot proven but in many cases less also arson.

ural areas and in the south of the y the situation is not as bad as it amburg, but arson is proving an ingly large-scale problem for fire nce companies all over the world.

he United States the number of cases has quadrupled over the cade, with organisations offering ervices in laying fires to order.

nomic crises tend to intensify the ion to solve problems by fire. uptcy is still felt to be a disgrace, fire is rated an undeserved stroke

kers who have been sacked have known to set fire to the firm in re. School-leavers have been known fire to their school for similar rea. Then there are politically motivates of arson.

tistics from the past testify to the t to which subjective factors play a in fire insurance claims.

n money was worthless and in ran riot, as in the immediate war years or during the 1923 hypeion, there were fewer claims than


reason was that claims were paid thless paper money.

versely, when in times of crisis ale value of insured objects takes k the number of fraud cases sky.

n oil and fuel prices soared there remarkable number of claims in of motor-boats reported stolen.

tale is much the same when the value of a horse insured for ,000 plummets and it would be ly to raise DM15,000. The risk of rse coming a cropper will tend to e alarmingly.

ms due to theft have got entirely



out of hand. There are so many break-ins that insuring household effects has become a casualty case.

Between 1977 and 1982 the claims it had to honour in respect of cases of theft increased in value by 128 per cent. In 1981 the number of bicycles reported stolen was 350,000.

Bicycles are no longer to be covered by household effects policies, and further restrictions in cover and higher premiums seem inevitable.

This only goes to show that in the long run it is policyholders themselves who have to foot the bill.

Theft has also come down heavily on motor insurance. In 1981 there were 118,000 claims in respect of stolen cars, with parts, such as aerials and car radios, being reported stolen in a further 1.1 million cases.

Insurers are sure many of these claims are fraudulent, and as in the case of household effects insurance, the extra cost of crime merely boomerangs on the average policyholder.

The premiums for fire and theft policies have lately been increased at an above-average rate as a result of the increase in claims.

There are plans to make claimants pay the first DM300 themselves to stem the tide of claims for theft.

Crime on the high seas has worried marine insurance companies for the past eight years. The switch in merchant shipping from traditional seafaring nations to other ports and the arrival of many developing countries on the scene have changed yardsticks.

Little is left of what used to be known as *christliche Seefahrt*, or Christian shipping. Ships are reported sunk and surface to ply the seas under a new name.

Freighters with what is claimed to have been valuable cargo (but was taken on board in this context of cloak-and-dagger secrecy) somehow happen to vanish without trace where the oceans are deepest.

The growth in fraudulent claims can no longer merely be explained in cyclical terms. The change is clearly one that is more fundamental in nature.

Insurance companies take on a buffer function by settling claims for damage in respect of criminal activities. They are tacitly redistributing substantial sums of money.

People tend to forget that this contributes toward peace and quiet in public life.

If people could not feel sure the insurance would settle a claim after a break-in or a fire they would be inclined to take more drastic action.

They would arguably convert their homes into castles and keep guns handy by the bedside.

How long, one wonders, can insurance companies maintain this compensatory role? How long, for that matter, are policyholders going to pay the extra that is the result of crime?

An entire package of measures is probably needed to cope with the problem. Insurers must certainly insist on policyholders taking greater precautions.

This is the context in which making claimants foot part of the bill must be considered. People who know the insurance will not cover the first so-and-so many hundred marks of a claim are bound to be more careful.

The companies for their part must be more careful who they do new business with. Their determination to line up new customers and boost turnover at all costs has at times made them blind to the risks.

Stricter screening of would-be new clients is needed to rule out risks that might be considered in any way shady.

Insurance companies are usually the first to clamour for more effort to be devoted to fighting crime, although the thought does not usually occur to them until it is a matter of insurance frauds.

But this is a much wider issue that probably calls for sweeping changes in social policy.

What importance ought to be attached to the protection of the individual and his property from criminal acts in our society? That is the wider issue which is at stake.

Arno Surminski

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 28 May 1983)

When tenants can stay put and ignore the landlord

A New York court has ruled that landlords need allow only members of tenants' families to live in rented accommodation.

They can throw out anyone else.

Thousands of New Yorkers who live with common law husbands, wives or partners (or simply friends who live together) are worried they now might be evicted.

Falling that they could well find themselves hit by hefty rent increases. Tenants' associations are raising Cain. What likelihood is there of a similar ruling in Germany?

Unless all the signs are deceptive any such fears are unfounded. At present the law in Germany is tending to move in the other direction.

If you want to share your home with a friend you can usually do so regardless whether the landlord is happy with the arrangement.

Even the Supreme *Land* Court in Hamm, Westphalia, which is not normally known for firebrand rulings, recently decided that:

"A justified interest on the tenant's part in giving a home to another person exists when for personal reasons the tenant wants to live together with a person of the same or the other sex or for economic reasons would like to share the apartment."

Only in exceptional circumstances is the landlord entitled to reject the extra person. There are three categories to which the courts regularly refer in this context.

● The new tenant gives ground for rejection by disturbing the peace. No landlord need to tolerate a chronic alcoholic who comes home night after night singing at the top of his voice as he staggers up the stairs.

● The apartment is overcrowded or subjected to a lot of wear and tear as a result of the newcomer. A single mother with three children in a two-roomed apartment cannot take in her boyfriend against the landlord's will.

● The landlord lives in the same block. In this case, as close neighbours, the tenant must be particularly careful. Someone who lives in the upstairs apartment in his landlord's home is more likely to have trouble with the landlord in this context than someone who lives in an apartment block managed by some property company or other.

Close neighbourhood is not always sufficient argument, as a Federal Supreme Court ruling showed in a recent case in which a divorced couple lived in the same house.

After their divorce they had made over the property to their children but retained their respective rights to live in the house for the rest of their lives.

The man lived on the ground floor, the woman on the first floor. After a while the man took in a new woman to share his life. His ex-wife and the children said she had to go.

They took the case to court and lost. The court ruled that although as the law stood only members of the family and servants were entitled to live in the apartment the same right must be enjoyed by a new partner, whether in wedlock or not, as long as he or she was intended as a long-term relationship.

Strictly speaking this ruling only applies to home-owners, and it is controversial among the legal profession too.

There are lawyers who feel it is a fateful contribution toward legal policy. They criticise it for being misleading and upsetting family life and its established order.

Even so, the open mind shown by the German Supreme Court on common law marriages is shown by other rulings besides the one cited.

So there is no immediate likelihood of a repeat of the situation in New York.

Eva Marie von Münch

(Die Zeit, 10 June 1983)

Stores try and clamp down as theft hits epidemics levels

plifting has become an epidemic an affluent society like Germany. tting worse each year.

ps and stores are continually testw protection systems and proseoffenders. That is as far as the rede can legally go; the rest is up to urts.

many supermarkets and hypermartore managers are no longer preto let matters rest there. They started making random bag , which they have no right to do.

y can only ask someone to reveal ontents of a shopping bag if the good reason for suspecting theft.

Retail Trade Association in Cowill hear nothing of spot checks.

Criminal code regulations say that only judges, public prosecutors and police officers from a certain rank upwards are entitled to make spot checks.

Shopkeepers may be aggrieved at dishonesty but they would be well advised not to overstep the mark.

Customers who feel unfairly suspected could well take store managers and proprietors to court, with the resulting adverse publicity.

Shops would do better to provide lockers or wardrobe facilities for customers' shopping bags — properly insured, of course.

But the customers are still not obliged to take kindly to the idea.

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 26 May 1983)